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Chapter VII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND
APPRAISAL: POLICY AND LAW

T

he Tanker War is important for many reasons. For the belligerents, Iran and
Iraq, it represented the maritime aspects of total war. For neutral Persian
Gulf States the war was a major if not a dominant factor. Other neutral countries,
e.g., the United States, at first treated the conflict as a policy matter, e.g., by proclaiming the need to maintain freedom of the seas and free access through the
Strait ofHormuz, although they may have had naval or other forces in the area on
routine or special operations. By the war's end in 1988, however, many countries,
including the United States, were involved in the conflict in direct military action,
e.g., convoying, accompanying or escorting neutral merchantmen, or indirectly
through mine clearance and similar operations, as well as continuing statements of
policies of freedom of the seas and the right of straits passage. States aligned with
the belligerents, e.g., some Gulf countries, Arab League members, and other nations, e.g., much of Western Europe, the USSR and the United States, dependent
on Gulf oil or concerned with law of the sea, self-defense and law of armed conflict
issues, became increasingly involved politically and economically. In some instances involvement came through individual States' actions, and in other cases
through collective statements or actions through intergovernmental organizations, e.g., the Arab League, the European Economic Community, the formerly
moribund Western European Union, or the Group of Seven. Gulf States formed
the Gulf Cooperation Council initially for internal security; the GCC assumed an
economic and national security posture as the war continued. The Cold Wargridlocked UN Security Council also became increasingly involved as the Tanker
War continued, passing resolutions condemning belligerents' deprivations of
high seas freedoms, violations of the LOAC, and continuation of the war in general. The war ended with Iran's accepting Council Resolution 598, establishment
ofUNIIMOG to supervise a ceasefire, and neutrals' individual and collective efforts to clear the Gulf of mines.
Although some commentators date the Tanker War from 1982 or perhaps 1984
when belligerents' interceptions of and attacks on merchant ships accelerated, the
war at sea actually began with the initial land battles in 1980 near the Shatt aI-Arab
when 70+ merchantmen were bottled up in the Shatto The belligerents' exclusion
zone proclamations and attempts to route neutral traffic came soon thereafter. By
1988 seafaring countries had suffered major tonnage losses in their merchant
fleets, particularly tankers, but a worldwide glut of available bulk petroleum
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carriers pardy offset these losses. The number of ships lost, or declared constructive total losses, was relatively low because of merchant ships' growth in size since
World War II. Nevertheless, more merchant mariners lost their lives during
1980-88 than at any time since that War; again, the number was low because of
smaller-sized merchant crews on most ships. Iraqi attacks on Iran's Nowruz facilities produced a major oil spill in the Gulf; spills probably also resulted from
belligerents' attacks on other enemy facilities and neutral countries' shoreside petroleum production or pumping facilities. Undoubtedly oil slicks resulted from
belligerents' attacks on merchantmen or after neutral navies responded in self-defense to belligerents' maritime attacks.
Chapter II discusses these developments in more detail. And while Chapter III
analyzes the Tanker War in the context of self-defense and other aspects of the jus
ad bellum under the UN Charter, and Chapters IV (LOS issues), V (LOAC issues)
and VI (law of the maritime environment) analyze LOS andjus in bello (i.e., LOAC)
problems during the war, a summary of important legal aspects of the Tanker War
and projections for the future are useful here.

Part A. Self-Defense, Charter Law and Neutrality Issues!
After the Nicaragua Case and its applying customary law alongside the Charter,
which is a treaty (albeit the most important of the post-World War II agreements
because of its Article 103 trumping provision for other treaties and the possibility
that parts of it may now havejus cogens2 status), a principal issue arising from the
war is the definition and scope of the right of self-defense. First, it is arguable, following the Case, that a parallel customary law of self-defense travels alongside
Charter-based principles deriving from Article 51. Second, this customary right of
self-defense may be different in content and scope from Charter-based norms and
therefore subject to the balancing of sources oflaw usually employed in determining norms to be applied in a situation.3 Third, if the right of self-defense is ajus
cogens norm, as some claim, it has priority over all other rules (custom, treaties,
general principles, etc.) except other jus cogens norms, e.g., the law under the Charter, Article 2(4). (If self-defense is ajus cogens norm, it must be balanced with other
jus cogens norms, e.g., those under Article 2(4).)
The Tanker War did not resolve these issues. Indeed, belligerents' claims and
counterclaims of aggression at the beginning of the war left neutrals in a legal
quandary, if one subscribes to a view, characterized as nonbelligerency during
1939-41 when the United States was officially neutral, that under the Charter
States may aid victims of aggression. Unlike the 1990-91 Coalition buildup against
Iraq where Iraqi aggression was blatant, the 1980-88 war's record is far from clear.
However, practice since 1945 seems to poin tto a right of countries to aid victims of
aggression, the position of the International Law Association's Budapest Articles
interpretation of the Pact of Paris (1928), still in force for the United States and
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many countries when treaty succession principles are considered. The Pact condemns the use of war as an instrument of national policy, subject to the inherent
right of self-defense.4 The Falklands/Malvinas War is an example of aggression
and neutrals' response to aid a target of aggression, the United Kingdom.
The Tanker War supplies several examples of informal collective self-defense,
which continues to exist during the Charter era as a valid response, provided adequate notice of actions is given. Unlike the 1990-91 conflict, where the United
States had self-defense agreements with Kuwait and perhaps other Gulf countries
and the possibility of multilateral NATO involvement ifIraq had moved against
Turkey to the north, there was no formal treaty arrangement proclaiming a right of
collective self-defense like the soon to be defunct Warsaw Pact, the NATO treaties,
or bilateral agreements the United States and many nations have negotiated since
World War II. To be sure, the GCC pledged collective action in many respects, but
it does not have a formal statement of collective self-defense. Nevertheless, it may
be argued that the GeC engaged in informal collective self-defense actions among
its members during the Tanker War.
Neutrals' cooperating to clear the Gulf of mines, and the Red Sea in the case of
the 1984 Libyan mining, are other examples ofinformal collective self-defense. Insofar as the record indicates, there were no formal treaties proclaiming self-defense
arrangements among Gulf and other States for this and similar purposes. N evertheless, when these countries worked together to clear the seas of mines, they were
in effect acting collectively to defend coastal States' shores, and countries' merchant shipping plying these waters, from the potential for mine attack.
The same might be said for cooperation to protect neutral shipping from
belligerents' air and warship attacks. The US declaration that it would extend protection to foreign-flag neutral merchant ships not carrying goods destined for a
belligerent, upon that neutral's request, was a third example of informal collective
self-defense. The United States had a right to defend US-flag merchant ships under longstanding rules of international law; this included its right to defend Kuwaiti tankers reflagged under US law and the LOS. However, in those situations
only US flagged vessels were involved; issues of collective self-defense, formal
through treaty or informal through other arrangements, did not arise. When the
United States published its policy of defending foreign-flag ships upon request, it
legitimately acted under a right of informal self-defense as long as the policy was
published, was clear, and did not otherwise violate Charter principles, e.g., aiding
an aggressor.
Belligerents' attacks on neutral territories, including oil production or pumping facilities, were violations of Article 2(4), and could have triggered a right ofindividual or collective self-defense. The same could be said about belligerents'
attacks on neutral flag shipping where there were no LOAC violations (e.g., fleeing
legitimate belligerent attempts to exercise visit and search).
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The United States claimed rights ofself-defense in its responses to attacks on its
warships and US-flag merchant ships. In most cases these responses were reactive
in nature, i.e., coming after a belligerent's attack. In some cases a response came
while a belligerent was attacking or threatening attack; this invoked anticipatory
self-defense issues. Commentators agree that self-defense responses, whether reactive or anticipatory, must be necessary and proportional under the circumstances.
Commentators disagree on whether a right of anticipatory self-defense, which appends a requirement of no other alternative besides the response, exists in the
Charter era. Given the nature of modern weaponry and its delivery systems, it
would seem that a right of anticipatory self-defense, whether delivered individually by a State or collectively by countries acting in formal concert (i.e., pursuant to
treaty) or informally, is admissible during the Charter era. To repeat: This right of
anticipatory self-defense is subject to limitations, e.g., necessity, proportionality,
admitting of no other alternative, and prior consultation (perhaps agreed in advance) for collective response. Responding States are bound by what their leadership knows, or would be reasonably expected to know, at the time of decision.s
Necessity and proportionality principles for self-defense responses may be, but are
not necessarily, the same as those to be observed during LOAC situations. For example, during war belligerents may attack any legitimate military target (e.g., an
enemy warship far from a war operations area), while self-defense proportionality
may dictate a different rule (e.g., a warship far from an area of attack invoking a
self-defense response mayor may not be a proper target under self-defense proportionality principles). Although under the majority view the right of reprisal
through use of force in peacetime is no longer an option in the Charter era, countries may respond through nonforce reprisals (proportional acts that are unlawful,
e.g., trade sanctions in violation of trade treaties, seeking to compel an offender to
observe the law) or retorsions (unfriendly acts, e.g., naval forces operating on the
high seas offa State's coasts). There is nothing in the US actions during the Tanker
War to indicate that it violated principles of necessity and proportionality, or that
there were viable alternative actions the United States could have taken in anticipatory self-defense situations, during the Tanker War, based on what the United
States or its military commanders knew at the time of response. This is why, e.g.,
the Airbus response was legitimate; based on what the Vincennes commanding officer knew atthe time, he thought an attack was coming from an Iranian fighter. The
response was necessary, proportional and admitting of no other alternative,
thereby meeting the Caroline Case criteria, from what the commander then knew.
It was a tragic mistake for which the United States paid compensation while not
admitting liability.
In terms of UN Security Council lawmaking, i.e., Council decisions binding as
law on UN Members through Charter Articles 25 and 48, there were none that affected the war at sea. However, the Council's increasing interest in and resolutions
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on the war was apparent. The Council passed Resolutions 540 and 552, confirming
as a matter of supportive "soft law," rights of freedom of navigation and access to
neutral ports. Resolution 598 (1987), the basis for the 1988 ceasefire, was the first
Council resolution specifically referring to a breach of the peace and Articles 39-40
of Chapter VII of the Charter.
The Tanker War also illustrates the relationship between rules of engagement
and the law of self-defense. US ROE, then and now, instruct commanders that regardless of options listed in the rules, the first duty is defense of the command or
unit. This is coincident with the law of self-defense in the Charter era. ROE may
give options that may be more restrictive than what international law might permit in a given situation.

Part B. The Law of the Sea and the Tanker War
The Tanker War illustrated two fundamental principles applicable to armed
conflict and the LOS: (1) the primacy of self-defense over norms in the LOS conventions;6 (2) the LOS, whether stated in treaties or customary law, is subject to
other rules of international law, i.e., the LOAC, in situations involving armed conflict at sea?
As to specific LOS issues, Security Council Resolutions 540 and 552 and neutrals' protests and actions confirmed customary high seas freedoms and entry into
neutral ports. The right of neutrals, including neutral warships, to unimpeded
straits passage, i.e., through the Strait ofHormuz, was also confirmed.
The straits passage controversy is but one more argument for ratifying the 1982
LOS Convention by major maritime powers, e.g., the United States. Others on the
periphery of the war include strengthening customary warship immunity rules,
for which there is a gap in the 1958 LOS conventions; standards for warship innocent passage in the territorial sea; maritime environmental standards; and rules
delimiting ocean areas like the EEZ, continental shelf, contiguous zone and territorial sea. 8
Although more ofan issue ofadmiralty and maritime law and only indirectly an
LOS issue, the war demonstrated the relationship of national decisionmaking, and
perhaps decisions at international levels, with private interests, e.g., seafarers and
their unions and the complicated web of parties (vessel owners, charterers,
sub charterers, cargo interests, marine insurance) engaged in ocean trade, whether
in war or peace. Arms suppliers might operate contrary to national policies, or perhaps with overt or covert governmental assistance.
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Part C. The Tanker War and the Law of Armed Conflict
The Tanker War raised many issues relevant to modem warfare at sea. While
Parts V.A-V.I analyze these in more detail, this Part offers summaries ofimportant
points.
1. Basic Principles: Necessity and Proportionality; ROE;
the Spatial Dimension. 9
The general factual record is not clear as to whether the belligerents generally
observed LOAC principles of necessity, proportionality and distinction in attacks
during the Tanker War, based on information they had or should have had when
deciding on attacks. However, it is reasonably certain that these principles were
not observed in specific situations, e.g., mine warfare, discussed below and in Parts
V.B-V.I.
The war is an example of the difference between necessity, proportionality, etc.,
principles that must be observed under the LOAC and principles employing the
same names, e.g., necessity and proportionality, that must be observed in self-defense responses. What is necessary and proportional in a self-defense response, and
what is necessary and proportional under the LOAC, may be entirely different.
The United States observed these principles in its self-defense responses where its
warships and military aircraft were under attack, or were reasonably believed to be
under attack, and in its responses to attacks on merchant shipping. Whether these
responses would have met LOAC standards, or whether a different and greater or
lesser response would have been in order if the United States had been at war with
Iran or Iraq, would have required different analysis. For example, the United
States responded proportionally in self-defense in shooting to destroy Iranian naval vessels and platforms attacking it. The United States would not have been required to wait for an Iranian attack, or threat of attack under anticipatory
self-defense principles, if the United States had been at war with that country.
The war also demonstrates differences in ocean spatial dimensions under the
LOAC and the LOS. The LOAC recognizes only two divisions of ocean areas: the
high seas and territorial waters, today equated to the territorial sea. The LOAC
also differentiates between belligerents' territorial seas and territorial seas ofneutrals, while the LOS has no similar differentiation. A belligerent may wage war,
subject to other LOAC principles (e.g., rights of neutrals, principles of humanity,
etc.) on the high seas, in its territorial waters, in its allies' territorial waters and in
enemy territorial waters. It may not wage war in neutral territorial waters. To do so
violates the LOAC. It is also a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, if directed
against the neutral coastal State, and would therefore be subjectto that State's right
to exercise individual and collective self-defense. It would also be a violation of
LOS innocent passage rules. Thus belligerents' attacks on neutrals' coastal
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installations during the Tanker War was an LOAC violation, an LOS violation to
the extent that belligerents did not exercise innocent passage rules or overflew
neutral territorial waters without coastal State permission, and a violation of the
Charter.
The LOAC and Charter law are not the same in this context, either. For example, a belligerent may attack an enemy ship, e.g., a submarine, lurking in neutral
territorial seas where that neutral either cannot or will not cause the submarine to
leave under the LOAC, under principles of necessity. A neutral could not attack
that submarine unless threatened by it under principles of self-defense, and the
standards for either attack might be the same or different. No such incidents occurred during the Tanker War, however, but this again illustrates the point of the
difference between self-defense principles and LOAC principles. Nor are the LOS
and the LOAC necessarily the same under the circumstances. For example, neutral warships are subject to the LOS innocent passage regime for territorial sea pas:
sage, while belligerents' warships are subject, under special LOAC rules applicable
to them through the LOS other rules principle, to the LOAC during war. If a belligerent's warship within neutral territorial waters and subject to the LOAC for
such passage threatens or attacks a coastal State, that coastal State has inherent
rights of individual or collective self-defense besides rights it might have under
the LOAC governing belligerent warship passage. Conversely, the warship retains
its rights of individual and collective self-defense. The same is true for neutral
warships legitimately exercising LOS rights of innocent passage. If a warship
transiting under innocent passage rules attacks or threatens a coastal State, that
State may respond in self-defense in addition to whatever claims it might have under the LOS. Conversely, the warship retains its rights ofindividual and collective
self-defense.
As noted above, LOS divisions of the sea (e.g., high seas fishing areas, EEZs,
continental shelf waters, contiguous zones, or the Area) are high seas areas for
LOAC purposes. Robertson advanced a view, which the San Remo Manual accepts,
that belligerents must observe due regard for neutrals' rights in these areas, including neutrals' high seas rights of,e.g., freedom ofnavigation and overflight, pipeline
and cable laying, etc., so long as there is no positive LOAC rule governing a situation. LOS high seas freedoms definitions of ocean areas, e.g., of the EEZ, may be
used in LOAC situations as rules for belligerent operations, but the two need not
coincide. Where they do, there may be confusion as the sometimes muddled
claims of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War demonstrate. Thus it was proper for
Iran and Iraq to declare maritime exclusion zones, analyzed under the name ofwar
zones in this volume, whose boundaries sometimes coincided with LOS lines, as in
the case of Iranian territorial sea claims, and sometimes stretched over the high
seas far beyond belligerents' EEZ claims. Whether use of these zones was lawful
during the war is a different story, however. 10
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The war also raised issues of neutrals' straits passage rights during war. As Part
IV.B.6 demonstrates, the LOS recognizes many varieties of international straits,
depending on special treaty regimes in a few cases and geographic or LOS considerations, e.g., whether a strait connects two high seas areas or otherwise, in other
situations. The Strait ofHormuz, one of the Earth's great sea transportation arteries, or choke points in geopolitical terms, may have been a high seas passage strait
when the war began in 1980 and a three-mile territorial sea limit, although waning
as a customary norm, was in force for many countries including the United States.
As such, Iran had no right to close the strait, any more than it had a right to close
high seas areas for other than limited times incident to belligerent naval operations.ll By the war's end, however, it was reasonably clear that coastal States could
validly claim 12-mile territorial seas, the result being that except for perhaps a narrow sliver of high seas, unusable for navigation ofall shipping but dhows, the Strait
was governed by the 1982 LOS Convention transit passage regime as a matter of
customary law. States' continued protests over perceived Iranian threats to close
the Strait, and the majority view of commentators since 1980, combine to declare
that no belligerent may close international straits like Hormuz to neutral
shipping.

2. Visit and Search; Capture, Destruction or Diversion. 12
Iran conducted visit and search operations involving neutral merchant ships it
suspected of carrying goods to Iraq to sustain its war-fighting or war-sustaining effort. Iran was within its rights to conduct these operations, but attacking neutral
merchantmen incident to otherwise lawful visit and search was inadmissible unless the merchant ships were attempting to evade visit and search. Iran could employ military aircraft for these operations, but these aircraft could not attack
neutral merchantmen involved in visit and search operations unless these vessels
were attempting to escape. Both belligerents legitimately flew aircraft over the
Gulf for general surveillance as a high seas freedom, but these aircraft could not indiscriminatelyattack neutral merchantmen. The Tanker War strengthened the
principle that belligerents may use military aircraft, including helicopters, in addition to warships for visit and search operations.
The United States and other neutrals were within their rights to convoy, escort or accompany neutral merchant ships that did not carry goods sustaining
belligerents' war efforts. A neutral could convoy, escort or accompany a merchantman flying that neutral's flag, and that neutral could convoy, escort or accompany
merchant vessels with other neutrals' registry if the two States agreed on this procedure. Belligerents' attacks on these formations could be met by self-defense responses. Neutrals could clear mines belligerents laid indiscriminately on the high
seas, particularly those laid in shipping lanes, also under self-defense principles.
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3. Belligerents' Seaborne Commerce; Belligerents' Convoys. 13
Apparently the belligerents did not attack platforms the LOAC exempts as targets unless they contribute to the enemy war effort, e.g., hospital ships or civil airliners. On the other hand, Iran and Iraq did not always discriminate between
merchant ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargo for the enemy under
enemy flags and innocent merchantmen with other cargoes. While it was lawful
for Iraq to attack merchantmen, regardless of flag, under Iranian military convoy,
it was not lawful for Iran or Iraq to attack independently-steaming merchantmen
bound for neutral ports and not carrying goods for the enemy war effort. It was also
not lawful for Iran to attack neutral flag merchant ships accompanied, escorted or
convoyed by neutral warships.
As noted in Part C.l, it is also questionable whether Iranian and Iraqi attacks
were necessary and proportional when visit, search and diversion were options,
and whether under the circumstances belligerents observed humanitarian law
standards in caring for merchant ship survivors after attacks, particularly in the
case ofIranian surface ship actions.
Neutral-flag warships could respond in self-defense to belligerents' attacks on
merchant ships flying their flag, and to attacks on other neutrals' merchant ships if
the flag State requested protection. Although these responses were governed by
the law of self-defense and not the LOAC, LOAC and LOS principles for succoring survivors applied in these situations, even though necessity and proportionality principles might have been different from LOAC standards for responses to
these attacks. The same principles applied to what were perceived to be belligerents' attacks, or threats of attack, on neutral warships. There is no evidence
that neutrals' responses were other than necessary and proportional, or admitting
of no other alternative in the case of anticipatory self-defense, or that neutrals did
not apply humanitarian standards after responding.
4. Neutral Flag Merchantmen: Enemy Character; Rejlagging; Contraband. 14
Neutral flag merchantmen that Iran convoyed down its coasts acquired enemy
character by being convoyed. War-fighting or war-sustaining goods aboard neutral flag merchant ships preceding to or from belligerents' ports and under belligerent direction or control would also have resulted in characterization as flying an
enemy flag and therefore being subject to belligerents' attack and destruction besides liability to visit, search, diversion and condemnation as prize. On the other
hand, goods destined to or from neutral ports, invoiced under other than a belligerent's title, did not give a neutral flag merchant ship enemy character. These vessels were not subject to attack on this account.
During the war neutral States' merchantmen were reflagged under US or other
registry. Besides qualifying as neutral flag merchant ships under the LOS, under
the LOAC these vessels were considered as flying a neutral flag. Unless, e.g., they
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carried war-fighting or war-sustaining goods destined to or from a belligerent port
while under belligerent direction or attempted to evade legitimate visit and search,
they were not subject to attack on this account.
The law of contraband did not impact the war; it could have applied only to inbound cargoes destined for a belligerent. Therefore, this law did not apply to outbound shipments, nor did it apply to pipeline shipments to neutrals, even though
there may have been later transshipment to neutral flag ships for sealift. The law of
contraband could not have applied until 1988, when Iran published a list; contraband lists must be published before the law ofcontraband may be applied. That list
comported generally with modem principles, allowing diversion and prize court
condemnation of ships carrying war-fighting or war-sustaining cargoes destined
to or from an enemy, instead of high seas seizure and later condemnation before a
prize court, or current concepts ofcontraband, which tend to ignore publication of
lists of absolute or conditional contraband and which only list goods not considered contraband, i.e., free goods, or humanitarian cargoes. Although systems like
navicerts or clearcerts have been used during the Charter era, e.g., during the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, thereis no evidence ofemployment of this option during the
war.

s. The Law ofBlockade and the Tanker War. 15
There is no formal record of either belligerent's declaring a blockade, although
commentators loosely mentioned blockade in their accounts, as similar sources
would during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Even if these commentators reflected government sources, neither belligerent observed well-established rules for blockades,
which must be noticed, be definite in area, and state a time when a blockade begins
an~ grace period for neutral ships to leave a blockaded area. It is doubtful whether
Iraq could have maintained an effective blockade, since it had no appreciable naval
assets to conduct one; paper blockades have been unlawful since the 1856 Paris
Declaration. Although Iraq might have declared a blockade to be enforced by aircraft, provided those aircraft could have functioned as surface ships do in blockade, e.g., communicating with merchant ships, diverting them as appropriate, or
boarding them for visit and search, Iraq did not declare such a blockade. Iran's attempts to inhibit Kuwait or Saudi Arabia-bound merchant traffic by mining, warships or aircraft attacks could not have been characterized as a blockade; the
LOAC does not permit blockades of neutral coasts. Thus the UN Security Council
was fully justified in condemning this action in Resolution 552, in addition to the
Resolution's explicit invocation of LOS principles of freedom of the seas and freedom to enter neutral ports.
Iraq refused to allow passage of trapped merchant ships out of the Shatt aI-Arab
at the beginning of the war. Ifit had done so, this would have been permissible as a
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matter ofinternationallaw by analogy to cartel ships passing through blockade, ifa
legitimate blockade of nearby high seas areas had been declared.

6. Zones: Excluding Shipping,AircraftfromArea ofBelligerents' Naval Operations;
High Seas Defense Zones; War Zones; Air Defense Identification Zones; Ocean
Zones Created for Humanitarian Law Purposes. 16
Although customary law, recently confirmed in publications like theSanRemo
Manual and NWP I-14M, allows belligerents to exclude neutral shipping and aircraft from an immediate area of belligerent naval operations, there is no record of
this during the Tanker War.
The United States published warnings of risk of self-defense responses if shipping or aircraft came within stated ranges of US forces operating in international
waters. Although proclaiming these self-defense zones (SDZs) was admissible,
there is no obligation to publish them. They are like warnings, usually published
in NOTAMs and NOTMARs, that States may legitimately publish for peacetime
naval maneuvers, which Iran published during the Tanker War for this purpose.
States may use the seas beyond territorial waters for naval maneuvers if they have
due regard for others' high seas/EEZ uses, i.e., freedoms of navigation and overflight. States conducting peacetime high seas naval maneuvers may not exclude
other shipping and aircraft from the areas ofthese maneuvers as they can for belligerent naval operations during war. If there is a belligerent naval operation during
war that includes what would usually be considered peacetime naval operations,
e.g., high seas refueling in the course ofwar measures against an enemy, the right of
exclusion applies to the ocean area(s) affected insofar as the areas and times for the
operations coincide. States also have a right ofself-defense at sea, for which an SDZ
warning is notice. Exercise of self-defense does not require an SDZ notice as a prerequisite. A State's ROE or other national rules, perhaps stated in operation orders
or plans, may require it, but this would be a national policy or national law requirement and not a rule of international law.
The belligerents published war zone notices. Although these zones were not
"paper" zones, were reasonable in geographic scope and gave notice of times of application, they could not be used to justify free-fire on all shipping in these areas. If
not a paper zone, (i.e., a zone that a State proclaims when that State has insufficient
military assets to enforce the zone) and if noticed with stated times of application
and if reasonable in geographic scope under the circumstances, a war zone may be
proclaimed under the LOAC. LOAC principles, e.g., rules for visit and search, apply within the zone. States proclaiming a zone must have due regard for neutrals'
LOS rights, e.g., offreedom of navigation and overflight, and must have due regard
for the maritime environment, within the zone. Neutrals' rights to respond in individual and collective self-defense also apply within a zone. Belligerents also have
self-defense rights against neutral States within a zone.
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Saudi Arabia proclaimed an ADIZ over the Gulf during the war; it was within
its rights under international law to do so. Actions against intruding aircraft were
governed by the law of self-defense, i.e., responses had to be necessary and proportional, and in the case of anticipatory self-defense, admitting of no other alternative, under the circumstances of each situation, based on what the responsible
commander, which might have been a single aviator in the case ofsolo flights to investigate an intruder, knew or should have known at the time.

7. Weapons and Weapons Use; Mine Waifare. 17
There were two principal issues connected with weapons and weapons use during the Tanker War; shore bombardment from the sea and mine warfare at sea. Although Iraq used poison gas against its opponent in the land war during 1980-88,
there is no record of its use in the sea war. Intermediate range ballistic missiles
were employed during the War of the Cities, but these were land-launched and hit
land-based targets, an issue outside the scope of this volume.
There were attacks delivered from over the sea against land-oriented targets,
e.g., belligerents' strikes against oil platforms in enemy territorial seas and other
offshore zones and shore facilities. Shore-based aircraft, perhaps flying over the
Gulf; and perhaps belligerents' naval assets, delivered these attacks. The record is
not clear as to the lawfulness of these operations in terms of compliance with rules
for naval bombardment from the sea or air. Whether notice if appropriate was
given; whether Hague IX and Hague Air Rules standards, articulating general necessity and proportionality standards; whether civilian objects or historical, artistic, scientific or hospital sites were involved; whether belligerents attacked areas
where the civil population was concentrated; whether attacks were designed to
and did terrorize the civil population; or whether attacks followed general LOAC
principles of necessity and proportionality; is not clear from the available evidence. If the nature of attacks on Gulf shipping or the War of the Cities and other
land-based aspects of the war are indicators, there is a high likelihood that some or
all of these principles were at issue, and that there were LOAC violations. It is quite
likely, e.g., that general principles of necessity and proportionality were violated,
an example being the result of attacks on Iran's Nowruz facility in 1983, resulting
in a large oil spill into the Gulf. We do not know with certainty, from the available
record, whether and when LOAC violations occurred. These principles for shore
bombardment, whether from aircraft or warships, applied to the Tanker War,
however. Possible charges of LOAC violations are not proven in most cases.
The record of mine warfare during the war is better documented. In unleashing
what was in some cases unrestricted mine warfare, e.g., employing mines that did
not deactivate after becoming unmoored or laying mines in neutral shipping lanes
and perhaps neutrals' territorial waters, the belligerents violated general LOAC
principles of discrimination, necessity and proportionality. Failure to publish
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minefield locations or to give alternative routes around a minefield were also
LOAC violations, as was Iran's laying mines off neutral coasts solely to intercept
shipping. Iran's mining the Strait ofHormuz in an attempt to deny international
straits passage to neutral vessels also violated the LOAC. 18
During the war neutral navies engaged in mine countermeasures. International
law permitted sweeping of unlawfully laid mines in international waters, and in
neutrals' territorial seas with approval of the neutral coastal State. The law of
self-defense also authorized these actions. 19

8. Other Humanitarian Law Issues. 20
Parts V.A-V.G and VILC.l-VILC.7 have analyzed LOAC questions that arose,
or may have arisen, during the Tanker War. There were also humanitarian law issues related to merchant ship crews trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab in 1980, rescuing
those in peril on the sea, and neutral repatriations of belligerent armed forces
members.
If crew stranded in the Shatt aI-Arab were aboard vessels that had not acquired
enemy character, they were protected persons under the Fourth Convention and
were entitled to be returned home promptly. If aboard vessels that had acquired
enemy character, they had prisoner of war status. However, these PW mariners
were entitled to repatriation at cessation of hostilities in 1988, and not 10 years
later, when many PW's were repatriated. If seriously ill or wounded, they should
have been repatriated long before 1998. Ifinternees under the Fourth Convention,
they should have been returned at the end of hostilities.
US forces rescued surviving crew of the minelayer IranAjr after the US self-defense response. These crew members and remains ofdead crew were turned over to
Omani Red Crescent officials, who repatriated them to Iran. The United States
also picked up Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members after they went
overboard during another US self-defense response. Two died aboard US Navy
ships; the remains and the survivors were turned over to Omani Red Crescent officials, who sent them to Iran. After the US self-defense response against the Rostum
oil platforms, Iranian tugs were allowed to pick up survivors. As a technical matter,
the law of self-defense covered these situations, but the United States acted properly, following LOAC principles in rescuing survivors, or allowing them to be rescued. To the extent that other mariners were in peril after other self-defense
responses, e.g., the US response to Iranian warship attacks, the same principles
applied.
These situations might be contrasted with a US rescue of an Iraqi pilot whose
plane was shot down by an Iranian air-to-air missile; the basic rule of assisting
those in peril on the sea, common to the LOS and the LOAC, applied. (The United
States turned the pilot over to Saudi Arabian Red Crescent officials, who repatriated him to Iraq.) The same principles applied in other rescues of merchant
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mariners in peril after belligerents' attacks on merchant ships; there is no positive
record ofthis, but LOS and LOAC principles applied to these situations as well.
Although under humanitarian law the neutral Red Crescent officials of Oman
and Saudi Arabia should have detained the Iranian crews and the Iraqi pilot until
the end of hostilities, the opposing belligerents did not protest any of these actions.
Therefore, it can be argued that the opposing belligerent acquiesced in their premature repatriation.

9. Deception During Anned Conflict at Sea: Ruses and Perfidy. 21
There are no reported ruses of war, lawful or unlawful, adopted by belligerents
during the war. There are no reports ofperfidious conduct. Other neutrals' actions
may have been deceptive in nature, but they could not be considered ruses, since
neutrals employed them. These included warships' painting pendent numbers
black instead of white on black in the case of US warships to minimize reflective
surfaces attractive to missiles. As long as a warship displays its pendent number,
the LOAC is indifferent to its coloration. The same is true of nonreflective paint
for general hull coating or hull configuration to make the vessel relatively invisible
to missile radar, or emission control to minimize electronic radiations that might
attract missiles or invite attack.
Although there were situations where ships might have flown flags other than
those of their registry States (the proposal to use the UN or ICRC ensign to extract
merchantmen trapped in the Shattearlyin the war, and theproposallatein the war
for a UN flotilla), these possibilities did not come to fruition. False flags issues
therefore did not arise.
No perfidy issues arose when merchantmen began tailing neutral naval convoys
or simulating convoys during the night. This might have put the neutrals at
greater risk. However, since they were neutral flagged, and perfidy applies to
belligerents' conduct, no perfidy issue arose. Similarly, neutral merchant vessels
that were painted grey like warships did not raise a problem of perfidy.

Part D. The Tanker War and the Law of the Maritime Environment22
The Tanker War's impact on the Gulf maritime environment is less than clear.
The only recorded major environmental disaster occurred when Iraq attacked
Iran's Nowruz offshore oil installations in 1983. Even ifit could be argued that the
Kuwait Regional Convention and Protocol did not apply between the parties because of law of treaties principles like suspension or termination during war, the
law of treaties says thatthe Convention and Protocol continued to govern relations
between belligerents and neutrals unless suspended or ended under theories ofimpossibility of performance or fundamental change of circumstances.23 HQwever,
there were necessarily petroleum spills from vessels' bunkers or tankers split open
or sunk by belligerents' attacks or during neutrals' self-defense responses. Thus,
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although Chapter VI is largely theoretical when applied to the Tanker War, as media coverage ofIraq's outrageous and unlawful behavior during the 1990-91 Gulf
War demonstrated, environmental issues are likely to arise and become major considerations in future conflicts.
The law of the environment as expressed in regional agreements, e.g., the Kuwait Convention and Protocol, is subject to important qualifications. First, these
treaties, like all international agreements, are subject to the Charter and its principles, e.g., the right of self-defense.24 Second, regional agreements cannot be inconsistent with general LOS Convention standards.25 Third, like general LOS
principles affecting navigation, etc., they are subject, through the LOS Conventions' restatement of the other rules principle, to the LOAC in certain situations.26
Fourth, any treaty-based norms must be balanced against other sources, e.g., custom. 27 Fifth, any attempt to declare the right to a clean, healthful environment as a
human right is subject to the human rights conventions' derogation clauses and to
general law of treaties provisions dealing with LOAC situations,e.g., impossibility
of performance, fundamental change of circumstances, and the impact of armed
conflict on treaty obligations.28
Although there is little positive law governing environmental protection duringwar, many LOAC norms offer incidental but important protection to the environment if observed. These include rules, many of which are also customary
norms, stated in, e.g., the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Hague Air Rules, the
Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, cultural property treaties like
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, ENMOD, Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the Conventional Weapons Convention and its protocols. Although these treaties are often site, object or warfare method specific, many
(e.g., Hague IX, Protocol I, Conventional Weapons Convention) restate customary
rules applying to all warfare, e.g., military objective, necessity, proportionality and
limiting actors' liability to what they knew or should have known when they directed an attack. There seems to be no need for international agreements to govern
environmental protections during naval warfare.
Modem military manuals analyzing the place of the LOS and environmental
considerations during war at sea say due regard should be paid to neutrals' LOS
rights and obligations and to the environment without specifying whether there
should be one or two due regard applications, i.e., one governing LOS obligations
and another for the environment, or a single due regard analysis taking into account LOS and environmental policies and law. In some cases there is no clear
statement of the place ofpositive rules oflaw, e.g., in treaties governing the LOAC,
in connection with environmental protection. As Robertson persuasively argues,
the first step is to apply positive rules; if there are none, a due regard principle
should govern for environmental considerations. Chapter VI advocates a single due
regard principle, taking into account LOS issues and environmental principles. A
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single due regard principle, not necessarily the same one as in LOAC situations,
should also apply in self-defense situations where LOS and/or environmental considerations are at issue. Chapter VI also offers a factorial analysis for defining due
regard.

Part E. Projections for the Future
With the USSR's demise and the breakup of other countries, e.g., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia incident to the end of the Cold War, many trends portend for
the future of armed conflict situations at sea and the law governing them. As Chapters II-VI demonstrate and McDougal and his associates have theorized, the law
governing these situations is interactive with many factors, including values at
stake; participants with different and perhaps mUltiple perceptions that range
from the individual to the intergovernmental organization; situations that include time, geography, the degree oforganization, and relative crisis level; what assets can be brought to bear on a situation; coercive or persuasive strategies that
include military force, diplomacy, ideology, or financial strength; short-range outcomes and long-range effects to be achieved, after which goals should be clarified,
past trends described, conditions affecting those trends evaluated, future trends
predicted, and policy alternatives at that point reviewed. 29 This multifactor analysis should be no stranger to national or international planners or defense analysts,
who have used variants for years. 30 Part E.l discusses some geopolitical and other
trends emerging during the Tanker War; PartE.2 follows with trends in the law related to them.
1. Geopolitical and Other Trends Emerging During the Tanker War.
The separatist disintegration of the USSR into Russia and the USSR's component republics, and a possibility offurther spinoffs from Russia, today a federation
of semiautonomous areas, and dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, have been echoed in other countries. These include, e.g., Canada (the Quebec
separatist movement, establishment of a separate Inuit province), China (Tibet),
India and Pakistan (the festering Kashmir dispute), Indonesia (East Timor and
other parts of that archipelago), Iraq and Turkey (Kurds), Italy (tensions between
northern and southern Italian cultures), Mexico (native Americans in southern
Mexico), Spain (Basque areas), the United Kingdom (separate legislatures in Scotland and Wales) and all across Africa, where colonial boundaries often divide territories in which native populations of sometimes very different ethnic origins live
on different sides oflines.31 If the end of the Cold War ended fears of Soviet dominance and a perceived need for association with the United States while remaining
a cohesive State or nonalignment but with a cohesive facade for possible unified
opposition to the USSRin the case ofYugoslavia and maybe other countries, and if
Soviet dominance, now removed, has been a catalyst for expressing pent-up desires
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for separation (the case of the USSR itself, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the result in some areas has been clustering around other ideologies, e.g., tribalism,32
messianic and sometimes fanatic or fundamental religion (a factor in the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq war33), or political separatism, which continues to bedevil Russia today,
even after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, Europe, including countries beset with internal separatist
movements (e.g., Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom) has been moving through the
European Union toward greater economic and political integration that may prevent international wars that have ravaged it during the Twentieth Century.34 In
the Western Hemisphere the United States, emerging in political, economic and
military strength as the only superpower, has joined its neighbors in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, a northern hemisphere free trade zone with a
promise of developing even stronger economies for its members and a potential for
expansion to Central and South America. The Arab League remains a potential
force for cohesive action, as does the GCC,35 formed during the Tanker War.
Today the United Nations has over 180 Members, virtually all countries on
Earth except Switzerland. If it is too early today to determine whether the United
Nations, acting through Security Council decisions36 to maintain international
peace and security, the Cold War era (1947-91), with the risk ofaPermanentCouncil Member veto,37 was certainly no measure of the UN's potential. However,
Council resolutions promoting freedom of navigation were a positive indicator of
the UN's potential for the future. 38
The result of these developments may lie in an even more pluralistic world society, in which even the smallest and relatively weakest countries may choose to go
their own way rather than being coerced or guided by the more powerful. Add to
that the possibility of ethnic or religious fanaticism, and the possibility of national
decisions not guided by political, economic or legal considerations emerges. And
although certain areas of the Earth are relatively stable and prosperous due to economic integration (the EU, NAFTA), or are relatively prosperous, e.g., the United
States, budget expenditures for defense, and therefore naval forces, are down
worldwide.
With the Soviet threat gone, a rationale for maintaining large and expensive
armed forces is not as strong for many countries, including the United States. This
comes when the potential for use of armed forces is more mUltipolar than at any
time since 1945. Many similar situations involving use of forces occurred during
the Cold War as before it,39 but the principal thrust of national policies has
changed dramatically since 1991.40 One indicator of this has been the US Navy's
"From the Sea" emphasis on littoral warfare as distinguished from a blue water
high seas confrontation with the Soviet Union.41 One result is that navies may be
called upon to do more with less. The newer and economically weaker States may
decide to employ cheaper weapons, as distinguished from the relatively
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sophisticated (and expensive) weaponry that nations like the United States have.
The United States and other major naval powers will be called on to counter these
threats as well as more sophisticated weaponry, including adversaries' use of the
Internet.42
The beginnings of this were apparent during the Tanker War.
Although the mechanisms for formal collective enforcement of the peace were
available from 1980 through 1988, ending the war was as much a result of the
belligerents' mutual exhaustion as any outside pressure. The European Economic
Community, now the EU, and the Group of Seven passed resolutions, but these
were of no effect; there was no legal authority behind them. The GCC was politically and militarily weak, sometimes divided on which side to support during the
war. The Arab League was similarly divided, at least until the end of the war. Although NATO and WEU countries cooperated with each other and other nations,
including GCC countries, Gulf naval operations were geographically "out of area"
for both organizations. In the main the result was individual State action, or informal cooperation, for or against belligerents, with some countries (e.g., the United
States, the USSR) seemingly tilting either way, depending on circumstances. The
United Nations, with its potential for Security Council action that might have
ended the war sooner, did little until 1987, when Resolution 598, passed under
Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon the belligerents to end the war but did not
decide43 on action. Given the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of
flareups around the world where established alliances, e.g., NATO or the Rio Pact,
do not apply, might this be the trend for future crises?
Iranian Islamic fundamentalism was a factor in starting the war in 1980; it may
well have been a factor in prolonging it until that country was totally exhausted in
terms ofits economy, national morale and military forces. Planning for suicidal attacks on Gulf shipping apparently was part ofIran's strategy late in the war, and
this factor was echoed in at least neutral responses. The amended US SDZ announcements for a cordon sanitaire around US forces was one manifestation, and
clearly the reason for the Airbus tragedy lay in US fears of a kamikazi-style aerial
crash on a US warship analogous to the Beiruit truck bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. The media carry almost daily accounts of ethnic or religious-based violence; unquestionably this sort ofadvocacy may influence national
decisionmaking involving future naval wars.
Although the USSR, many European powers and the United States ordered naval forces to the Gulf or augmented forces already there, it became apparent that no
single naval power, not even the United States, had the kind of forces to meet all
contingencies. US lack of mine countermeasures ships and forces and dependence
on Western European navies is one example; acceptance of US offers for defense of
other countries' merchantmen is another. Even at the Cold War's height and as the
USSR and its navy and merchant marine began declining, there were not enough
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naval forces available to go around. The same was true for the contemporaneous
Falklands/Malvinas War (1982), when neither belligerent could bring overwhelming naval force to bear. This might be compared with the Korean War
(1950-53) or the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), where there were plenty of naval assets to prosecute policy.
It is virtually impossible to negotiate a treaty to regulate specific weaponry in an
age of rapid technological development. At the same time, for those countries with
less robust economies or defense budgets, there is the option of cheaper, often indiscriminate weapons, e.g. sea mines whose technology may date back 100 years.
For countries, e.g., the United States, with economic potential and industrial bases
for relatively sophisticated and expensive systems, there is the dilemma of having
to meet sophisticated threats while maintaining the capability for countering
more traditional but equally deadly weapons. The close-in rapid fire gun as a final
defense against missile or suicide aircraft attacks on warships is an example of a response to a threat as old as World War II's kamikazis, where the proximity fuse and
the 3-inch rapid-fire gun responded to these attacks. Lack of adequate mine countermeasures forces during the Tanker War is an example of the inability of a relatively sophisticated navy to meet and overcome a traditional, one might say
archaic, weapon threat. One further problem for the future might be marrying traditional technology with inexpensive but sophisticated components, e.g., using
the Internet to trigger traditional devices at great distance and litde cost to a country, either in manufacturing the device or means ofcommunicating it. Fortunately
for neutrals involved in the Tanker War, this variant did not occur.
Another factor that became apparent in the Tanker War was the interest of parties other than States or international organizations. These included arms suppliers, seafarers of many nations, their unions, ship owners and others involved in
ocean carriage (charterers, sub charterers, cargo interests, marine insurers), that
might involve still more countries' interests in a conflict. This was really a repetition ofbehind the scenes situations in earlier conflicts. For example, the US World
War II Lend-Lease program of supplying arms began before Pearl Harbor. The
pattern of parties involved in oceanic cargo transport is nearly the same as it has
been for years, the major changes being the advent oflarger and more automated
merchantmen, smaller crews, and a greater use of open registry (flag of convenience) shipping. This trend will continue in the future and may become even
more complicated with the growth oflarge transnational companies.
2. Developments in the Law: Trends jor the Future.
Invoking the inherent right of self-defense, particularly unit and individual
countries' claims for a right of anticipatory self-defense, is more likely in the pluralistic world of the next millenium. This is so for several reasons. First, the multilateral and bilateral self-defense alliances developed during the Cold War had a

624

The Tanker War

goal of containing the potential opponentes), i.e., the USSR and the Soviet bloc by
NATO, ANZUS, and bilateral treaties like those between Japan and the United
States and Korea and the United States, or their complimentary opposites, the
Warsaw Pact and a web ofbilaterals between the USSR and its satellites, the latter
now all defunct. Second, navies the world over are downsizing, in part due to the
Cold War's end and in part because of the spiraling cost of modern naval vessels.
The era oflarge fleet exercises as contemplated during the Cold War44 may be over.
Naval vessels that remain to patrol the world oceans, and merchant ships as well
for that matter, remain expensive assets. They are also quite vulnerable to attacks,
particularly by missiles that kill with the first strike. This new technology suggests
that countries are more likely to act preemptively, at displays of hostile intent
rather than hostile acts, to protect these scarce and increasingly valuable naval assets. An increased concern for human life, including the lives ofmilitary personnel
threatened by these kinds of attacks, is also a major factor. As long as principles of
proportionality, necessity and the availability of no other alternative are observed,
based on information known or what should have been known at the time, countries may successfully invoke anticipatory self-defense to justify responses in these
situations.
As long as new permanent Security Council Member veto issues do not arise, increased Council lawmaking through its decisions may be the order of the day in
future conflicts, perhaps started with assertions of the right ofindividual or collective self-defense. Whether this will be true is less than clear. An active General Assembly, where there is no veto but also no authority to enact positive rules oflaw in
these situations, may contribute to lawmaking through supporting resolutions asserting principles of law. The same may be true in other international organizations, e.g., IMO, a UN specialized agency, and the ICRC, a nongovernmental
organization.
Law of the sea issues will continue to arise. A major contributing factor to this
may be US failure to ratify the 1982 LOS Convention. Although the Convention's
navigational articles largely restate customary norms today, as the United States
delared nearly 20 years ago, custom can change through practice accepted as law.
However, if the LOS Convention becomes a worldwide treaty-based norm as the
1949 Geneva Conventions have for humanitarian law during war, the number of
sources for applying the Convention's terms as law has doubled.46 And while ratification is not an absolute assurance that the law will not change, since a contrary
custom can develop to outweigh treaty-based norms, the risk of change through
evolving custom may be halved, particularly since many nations stress the importance of treaties. For issues related to potential naval warfare situations, e.g., warship innocent passage and straits passage, the difference could be critical. This is
particularly true where there is an interface between LOAC standards and LOS
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principles that are relatively hazy because of the nature ofcustom in a world ofover
180 countries, most of them with seafaring capability.
If future wars at sea involve ever more sophisticated naval assets opposing sophisticated military assets, the result necessarily will be resort to traditional general LOAC principles, e.g., target discrimination, military objective, necessity and
proportionality. For these kinds of conflicts, present treaty law or other attempts
to specify particular weapons use under particular circumstances will almost always be outrun by human inventiveness. The same can be said about wars involving less sophisticated weapons, whether opposed by technologically advanced
systems or more traditional devices. Some warfare methods, particularly those
that are by nature indiscriminate, e.g., poison gas or bacteriological weapons, are,
will be, and should be, outlawed. Beyond this, however, the law of naval warfare
will remain as it has been for centuries, largely a corpus of custom and general
principles.
The maritime environment will continue to be an important factor in naval
warfare considerations. Although there was one reported environmental catastrophe during the Tanker War, the 1983 Nowruz spill, it was the 1990-91 war that resulted in massive destruction of the environment at sea, in the air and on the land.
Given greater public awareness through the media and today the Internet, the environment may become a major force in national and international decisionmaking. Here too widespread ratification of the LOS Convention will help; its
comprehensive terms for protection should promote due regard for the maritime
environment, in connection with due regard for neutrals' LOS Convention rights,
by belligerents. Moreover, many LOAC treaties, most of which restate customary
norms, offer protection for the environment if States observe these standards.

3. Final Thoughts.
Future conflicts at sea, like the Tanker War and in reality all wars, are likely to
be multidimensional in terms of participants, levels of participants, organization
of participants, interests ofparticipants (economic or otherwise), relative sophisti::ation of participants (e.g., in weapons available to them), perspectives of partici;>ants (perhaps based on ethnic or religious persuasions instead of nationalism or
.deologies like communism), and factors participants must consider (e.g., Charter
aw, neutrality or shades ofit, the general LOS, LOAC principles, the maritime en,ironment). Despite a growing number of international organizations and new
:ountries which may attempt to harness the worst or best intentions of humanity,
he beginning of the next millenium may be more pluralistic, more integrated and
t the same time more disintegrated than at any recent time before.
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